Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters are added one at a time, with the goal of making a distinguished alternative win by adding a minimum number of voters. In this paper, we initiate the study of combinatorial variants of control by adding voters: In our setting, when we choose to add a voter v, we also have to add a whole bundle κ(v) of voters associated with v. We study the computational complexity of this problem for two of the most basic voting rules, namely the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule.
Introduction
We study the computational complexity of control by adding voters [2, 24] , investigating the case where the sets of voters that we can add have some combinatorial structure. The problem of election control by adding voters models situations where some agent (e.g., a campaign manager for one of the alternatives) tries to ensure a given alternative's victory by convincing some undecided voters to vote. Traditionally, in this problem we are given a description of an election (that is, a set C of alternatives and a set V of voters who decided to vote), and also a set W of undecided voters (for each voter in V ∪ W we assume to know how this voter intends to vote which is given by a linear order of the set C; we might have good approximation of this knowledge from preelection polls). Our goal is to ensure that our preferred alternative p becomes a winner, by convincing as few voters from W to vote as possible (provided that it is at all possible to ensure p's victory in this way).
Control by adding voters corresponds, for example, to situations where supporters of a given alternative make direct appeals to other supporters of the alternative to vote (for example, they may stress the importance of voting, or help with the voting process by offering rides to the voting locations, etc.). Unfortunately, in its traditional phrasing, control by adding voters does not model larger-scale attempts at convincing people to vote. For example, a campaign manager might be interested in airing a TV advertisement that would motivate supporters of a given alternative to vote (though, of course, it might also motivate some of this alternative's enemies), or maybe launch viral campaigns, where friends convince their own friends to vote. It is clear that the sets of voters that we can add should have some sort of a combinatorial structure. For instance, a TV advertisement appeals to a particular group of voters and we can add all of them at the unit cost of airing the advertisement. A public speech in a given neighborhood will convince a particular group of people to vote at a unit cost of organizing the meeting or convincing a person to vote will "for free" also convince her friends to vote.
The goal of our work is to formally define an appropriate computational problem modeling a combinatorial variant of control by adding voters and to study its computational complexity. Specifically, we focus on the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule, mainly because the Plurality rule is the most widely used rule in practice, and it is one of the few rules for which the standard variant of control by adding voters is solvable in polynomial time [2] , whereas for the Condorcet rule the problem is polynomial-time solvable for the case of single-peaked elections [18] . For the case of single-peaked elections, in essence, all our hardness results for the Condorcet rule directly translate to all Condorcet-consistent voting rules, a large and important family of voting rules. We defer the formal details, definitions, and concrete results to the following sections. Instead, we state the high-level, main messages of our work:
• Many typical variants of combinatorial control by adding voters are intractable, but there is also a rich landscape of tractable cases.
• Assuming that voters have single-peaked preferences does not lower the complexity of the problem (even though it does so in many election problems [7, 10, 18] ). On the contrary, assuming single-crossing preferences does lower the complexity of the problem.
We believe that our setting of combinatorial control, and-more generally-combinatorial voting, offers a very fertile ground for future research and we intend the current paper as an initial step.
Related Work. Bartholdi et al. [2] first studied the concept of election control by adding/deleting voters or alternatives in a given election. They studied the constructive variant of the problem, where the goal is to ensure a given alternative's victory (and we focus on this variant of the problem as well). The destructive variant, where the goal is to prevent someone from winning, was introduced by Hemaspaandra et al. [24] . These papers focused on the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule (and the Approval rule, for the destructive case of Hemaspaandra et al. [24] ). Since then, many other researchers extended this study to a number of other rules and models [3, 16, 17, 19, 28, 27, 31, 33] . In all previous work on election control, the authors always assumed that one could affect each entity of the election at unit cost only. For example, one could add a voter at a unit cost and adding two voters always was twice as expensive as adding a single voter. Only the paper of Faliszewski et al. [19] , where the authors study control in weighted elections, could be seen as an exception: One could think of adding a voter of weight w as adding a group of w voters of unit weight. On the one hand, the weighted election model does not allow one to express rich combinatorial structures as those that we study here, and on the other hand, in our study we consider unweighted elections only (though adding weights to our model would be seamless).
The specific combinatorial flavor of our model has been inspired by the seminal work of Rothkopf et al. [35] 1 on combinatorial auctions (see, e.g., Sandholm [36] for additional information). There, bidders can place bids on combinations of items such that the bid on the combination of a set of items might be less than, equal to, or greater than the sum of the individual bids on each element from the same set of items. While in combinatorial auctions one "bundles" items to bid on, in our scenario one bundles voters.
In the computational social choice literature, combinatorial voting is typically associated with scenarios where voters express opinions over a set of items that themselves have a specific combinatorial structure (typically, one uses CP-nets to model preferences over such alternative sets [6] ). For example, Conitzer et al. [11] studied a form of control in this setting and Mattei et al. [30] studied bribery problems. In contrast, we use the standard model of elections where all alternatives and preference orders are given explicitly, but we have a combinatorial structure of the sets of voters that can be added.
Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with standard notions regarding algorithms and complexity theory. For each nonnegative integer z, we write [z] to mean {1, . . . , z}.
Elections. An election E := (C, V ) consists of a set C of m alternatives and a set V of |V | voters v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v |V | . Each voter v has a linear order ≻ v over the set C, which we call a preference order. For example, let C = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 } be a set of alternatives. The preference order c 1 ≻ v c 2 ≻ v c 3 of voter v indicates that v likes c 1 the best (1 st position), then c 2 , and c 3 the least (3 rd position). We call a voter v ∈ V a c-voter if c is at the first position of her preference order. Given a subset C ′ ⊆ C of alternatives, if not stated explicitly, we write C ′ to denote an arbitrary but fixed preference order over C ′ .
Voting Rules. A voting rule R is a function that given an election E outputs a (possibly empty) set R(E) ⊆ C of the (tied) election winners. We study the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule. Given an election, the Plurality score of an alternative c is the number of voters that have c at the first position in their preference orders; an alternative is a Plurality winner if it has the maximum Plurality score. An alternative c is a Condorcet winner [12] if it beats all other alternatives in head-to-head contests. That is, c is a Condorcet winner in election
Condorcet's rule elects the (unique) Condorcet winner if it exists, and returns an empty set otherwise. A voting rule is Condorcet-consistent if it elects a Condorcet winner when there is one (however, if there is no Condorcet winner, then a Condorcet-consistent rule is free to provide any set of winners). Domain Restrictions. Intuitively, an election is single-peaked [5] if it is possible to order the alternatives on a line in such a way that for each voter v the following holds: If c is v's most preferred alternative, then for each two alternatives c i and c j that both are on the same side of c (with respect to the ordering of the alternatives on the line), among c i and c j , v prefers the one closer to c. For example, single-peaked elections arise when we view the alternatives on the standard political left-right spectrum and voters form their preferences based solely on alternatives' positions on this spectrum. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 1 (Single-peaked elections). Let C be a set of alternative and let L be a linear order over C (referred to as the societal axis). We say that a preference order ≻ (over C) is single-peaked with respect to L if for each three alternative x, y, z ∈ C it holds that: There are polynomial-time algorithms that given an election decide if it is single-peaked and, if so, provide a societal axis for it [1, 15] . Single-crossing elections, introduced by Roberts [34] , capture a similar idea as single-peaked ones, but from a different perspective. This time we assume that it is possible to order the voters so that for each two alternatives a and b either all voters rank a and b identically, or there is a single point along this order where voters switch from preferring one of the alternatives to preferring the other one. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 2 (Single-crossing elections). An election E = (C, V ) is single-crossing if there is an order L over V such that for each two alternatives x and y and each three voters
As for the case of single-peakedness, there are polynomial-time algorithms that decide if an election is single-crossing and, if so, produce the voter order witnessing this fact [14, 8] .
Combinatorial Bundling Functions. Given a voter set X, a combinatorial bundling function κ : X → 2 X (abbreviated as bundling function) is a function assigning to each voter a subset of voters. For convenience, for each subset X ′ ⊆ X, we let κ(X ′ ) = x∈X ′ κ(x). For x ∈ X, κ(x) is called x's bundle (and for this bundle, x is called its leader ). We assume that x ∈ κ(x) and so κ(x) is never empty. We typically write b to denote the maximum bundle size under a given κ (which will always be clear from context). Intuitively, we use combinatorial bundling functions to describe the sets of voters that we can add to an election at a unit cost. For example, one can think of κ(x) as the group of voters that join the election under x's influence. We represent bundling functions explicitly: For each voter x we list the voters in κ(x).
We are interested in various special cases of bundling functions. We say that κ is leaderanonymous if for each two voters x and y with the same preference order κ(x) = κ(y) holds. Furthermore, κ is follower-anonymous if for each two voters x and y with the same preference orders, and each voter z, it holds that x ∈ κ(z) if and only if y ∈ κ(z). We call κ anonymous if it is both leader-anonymous and follower-anonymous. One possible way of thinking about an anonymous bundling function is that it is a function assigning to each preference order appearing in the input a subset of the preference orders appearing in the input. For example, anonymous bundling functions naturally model scenarios such as airing TV advertisements that appeal to particular groups of voters.
The swap distance between two voters v i and v j is the minimum number of swaps of consecutive alternatives that transform v i 's preference order into that of v j . Given a number d ∈ N, we call κ a full-d bundling function if for each x ∈ X, κ(x) is exactly the set of all y ∈ X such that the swap distance between the preference orders of x and y is at most d.
We introduce the concept of a bundling graph of an election, which, roughly speaking, models how the bundles of two voters interact with each other.
Definition 3 (Bundling graphs).
Given an input instance to C-CC-AV, the bundling graph is a simple and directed graph G = (V (G), E(G)). For each voter x there is a vertex u x ∈ V (G), and for each two distinct voters y and z such that y ∈ κ(z) there is an arc (u z → u y ) ∈ E(G).
For arbitrary bundling functions, the bundling graph is a directed graph. However, if κ is a full-d bundling function, that is, for each voter v, κ(v) contains all the voters at swap distance d, then the bundling graph can be thought of as being undirected, due to the following.
Lemma 1.
If κ is a full-d bundling function, then for any unregistered voter x and any y ∈ κ(x), it holds that x ∈ κ(y).
Proof. To see why the statement holds, notice that for any two voters x and y, if y ∈ κ(x), then the swap distance between x and y is at most d, therefore, because κ is a full-d bundling function, x must be in κ(y). This implies that for any arc (u x → u y ) in the bundling graph, the corresponding arc (u y → u x ) is also present in the bundling graph, therefore, we can treat the bundling graph as an undirected graph.
Notice that this is not always the case for an arbitrary bundling function. For instance, κ(x) = {x, y}, κ(y) = {y} is a valid possibility for a bundling function.
Central Problem. We consider the following problem for a given voting rule R:
W , a preferred alternative p ∈ C, and a bound k ∈ N. Question: Is there a subset of voters
, where R(C, X) is the set of winners of the election (C, X) under the rule R ?
We note that we use here a so-called nonunique-winner model. For a control action to be successful, it suffices for p to be one of the tied winners. Throughout this work, we refer to the set W ′ of voters such that p wins election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ )) as the solution and denote k as the solution size.
R-C-CC-AV is a generalization of the well-studied problem R Constructive Control by Adding Voters (R-CC-AV) (in which κ is fixed so that for each w ∈ W we have κ(w) = {w}). The non-combinatorial problem CC-AV is polynomial-time solvable for the Plurality rule [2] , but is NP-complete for the Condorcet rule [28] , therefore: Table 1 : Computational complexity classification of Plurality-C-CC-AV (since the noncombinatorial problem CC-AV is already NP-hard for Condorcet's rule, we concentrate here on the Plurality rule). Each row and column in the table corresponds to a parameter such that each cell contains results for the two corresponding parameters combined. Due to symmetry, there is no need to consider the cells under the main diagonal, therefore they are painted in gray.
ILP-FPT means FPT based on a formulation as an integer linear program.
Parameterized Complexity. An instance (I, k) of a parameterized problem consists of the actual instance I and an integer k being the parameter [13, 20, 32] . A parameterized problem is called fixed-parameter tractable (is in FPT) if there is an algorithm solving it in f (k)·|I| O(1) time, for an arbitrary computable function f only depending on parameter k, whereas an algorithm with running-time |I| f (k) only shows membership in the class XP (clearly, FPT ⊆ XP). If a parameterized problem is fixed-parameter tractable due to a formulation as integer linear program (ILP), then we say that this problem is in ILP-FPT. One can show that a parameterized problem L is (presumably) not fixed-parameter tractable by devising a parameterized reduction
Betzler et al. [4] survey parameterized complexity investigations in voting.
Our Contributions. We introduce a new model for combinatorial control in voting. As R-C-CC-AV is generally NP-hard even for R being the Plurality rule, we show several fixedparameter tractability results for some of the natural parameterizations of R-C-CC-AV; we almost completely resolve the complexity of C-CC-AV, for the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule, as a function of the maximum bundle size b and the maximum distance d from a voter v to the farthest element of her bundle. Further, we show that the problem remains hard even when restricting the elections to be single-peaked, but that it is polynomial-time solvable when we focus on single-crossing elections. Our results for Plurality elections are summarized in Table 1 .
Complexity for Unrestricted Elections
In this section we provide our results for the case of unrestricted elections, where voters may have arbitrary preference orders. In the next section we will consider single-peaked and single-crossing elections that only allow "reasonable" preference orders.
Number of Voters, Number of Alternatives, and Solution Size
We start our discussion by considering parameters "the number m of alternatives", "the number n of unregistered voters", and "the solution size k". A simple brute-force algorithm, checking all possible combinations of k bundles, proves that both Plurality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-C-CC-AV are in XP for parameter k, and in FPT for parameter n (the latter holds because k ≤ n). Indeed, the same result holds for all voting rules that are XP/FPT-time computable for the respective parameters. The XP result for Plurality-C-CC-AV with respect to the parameter k probably cannot be improved to fixed-parameter tractability. Indeed, for parameter k we show that the problem is W[1]-hard, even for anonymous bundling functions and for maximum bundle size three.
Theorem 1. Plurality-C-CC-AV is NP-hard and W[1]-hard when parameterized by the solution size k, even when the maximum bundle size b is three and the bundling function is anonymous.
Proof. We provide a parameterized reduction from the W[1]-hard problem Clique parameterized by the parameter h [13] , which asks for the existence of a size-h clique in an input graph G.
Let (G, h) be a Clique instance. Without loss of generality, we assume that G is connected, that h ≥ 3, and that each vertex in G has degree at least h − 1. We construct an election E = (C, V ) with C := {p, w, g} ∪ {c e | e ∈ E(G)}. The registered voter set V consists of h 2 + h voters each with preference order w ≻ C \ {w} , another h 2 voters each with preference order g ≻ C \ {g} , and another h voters each with preference order p ≻ C \ {p} . For each vertex u ∈ V (G), we define C(u) := {c e | e ∈ E(G) ∧ u ∈ e}, and construct the set W of unregistered voters as follows:
(i) For each vertex u ∈ V (G), we add an unregistered g-voter w u with preference order g ≻ C(u) ≻ C \ ({g} ∪ C(u)) , and we set κ(w u ) = {w u }. We call these unregistered voters vertex voters.
(ii) For each edge e = {u, u ′ } ∈ E(G), we add an unregistered p-voter w e with preference order p ≻ c e ≻ C \ {p, c e } , and we set κ(w e ) = {w u , w u ′ , w e }. We call these unregistered voters edge voters.
Since all the unregistered voters have different preference orders (this is so because G is connected, h ≥ 3, and each vertex has degree at least h − 1), every bundling function for our instance, κ included, is anonymous. To finalize our construction, we set k := h 2 . We show that G has a size-h clique if and only if (E = (C, V ), W, κ, p, k) is a yes instance for Plurality-C-CC-AV. For the "if" part, suppose that there is a subset W ′ of at most k voters such that p wins the election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ )). We show that the vertex set For the "only if" part, suppose that U ′ ⊆ V (G) is a size-h clique for G. We construct the subset W ′ by adding to it any edge voter w e with e ∈ E(G[U ′ ]). Obviously, |W ′ | = k. Now it easy to check that p co-wins with both w and g the election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ )) with score h 2 + h + 1. If we drop the anonymity requirement for the bundling function, then we obtain a stronger intractability result. For parameter k, the problem becomes W[2]-hard, even for two alternatives. This is quite remarkable because typically election problems with a small number of alternatives are easy (they can be solved either through brute-force attacks or through integer linear programming attacks employing the famous FPT algorithm of Lenstra [26] ; see the survey of Betzler et al. [4] for examples, but note that there are also known examples of problems where a small number of alternatives does not seem to help [9] ). Further, since our proof uses only two alternatives, it applies to almost all natural voting rules: For two alternatives almost all of them (including the Condorcet rule) are equivalent to the Plurality rule. The reduction is from the W[2]-complete problem Set Cover parameterized by the solution size [13] . Proof. We provide a parameterized reduction from the W[2]-complete problem Set Cover parameterized by the parameter h [13] .
Set Cover
Input: A collection S = {S 1 , . . . , S m } of subsets of the universe X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and h ∈ N. Question: Is there a size-h subset S ′ ⊆ S that covers the universe, that is,
Let (S, X, h) be a Set Cover instance. We construct an election E = (C, V ) with C = {p, g}. The registered voter set V consists of only (n − k) g-voters. We construct the unregistered voter set W as follows:
(i) For each element x i ∈ X, we construct one p-voter, denoted by w (ii) For each set S j , we construct one g-voter, denoted by w S j (called set-voter ), and we set κ(w
That is, the bundle for the voter corresponding to a set contains all of the voters corresponding to the elements of the set.
Finally, we set k := h and let d be arbitrary.
The construction is obviously a parameterized reduction, and we show now that there is a size-h subset S ′ ⊆ S that covers the universe if and only if there is a size-k subset W ′ of unregistered voters, such that if added (with their respective bundles) to the election, p becomes a Plurality winner of the election.
For the "if" part, suppose that there is such a size-k subset W ′ . Also, if there are some element-voters in the solution, then we can simply remove them, as they do not help p win, due to the dummy-voters. The only way to achieve the score increase of n − k for p is to have all of the element-voters added to the election, and this can be done only by covering all of the universe, with at most k set-voters; therefore, the solution corresponds to a set covering of the universe.
For the "only if" part, given a size-h subset S ′ ⊆ S that covers the universe, we choose, for every S j ∈ S ′ , its respective voter w S j , and add it to the election. This gives a size-k subset W ′ of unregistered voters, which easily can be verified to result in p winning the election.
As for the Condorcet rule, we use the same unregistered voters as defined above and we construct the original election with (2n − k − 1) g-voters and (n − k) p-voters.
The above proof uses the non-anonymity of the bundling function in a crucial way. If we require the bundling function to be anonymous, then C-CC-AV can be formulated as an integer linear program where the number of variables and the number of constraints are bounded by some function in the number m of alternatives. The idea behind this is that with anonymity we can formulate our problem through an integer linear program where the number of variables and the number of constraints are bounded by some function in m. Such integer linear programs are in FPT with respect to the number of variables [26] . Proof. We describe an integer linear program (ILP) with at most m! variables and at most m!+m constraints that solves both Plurality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-C-CC-AV. Fixedparameter tractability then follows, since any ILP with ρ variables and L input bits is solvable in O(ρ 2.5ρ+o(ρ) L) time ( [26] and [25] ). With m alternatives, there are at most m! voters with pairwise different preference orders in a given election. For each alternative a ∈ C, let s(a) be its initial score. Since the voters are anonymous, there are at most m! different bundles. Furthermore, we can assume that all voters in W ′ have pairwise different preference orders (this is because, due to anonymity, there is no additional gain of adding two voters with the same preference order).
Let For each preference order ≻ i , i ∈ [m!], we introduce one boolean variable x i , with the intent that the value of x i will be 1 if and only if W ′ contains a voter with preference order i. Indeed, an integer linear program usually tries to minimize or maximize a certain function, while here, we write the integer linear program as simply a feasibility problem. It can be easily rewritten with a minimization function instead. Now we are ready to state the integer linear program.
Constraint (1) 
Combinatorial Parameters
We focus now on the complexity of Plurality-C-CC-AV as a function of two combinatorial parameters: (a) the maximum swap distance d between the leader and his followers in one bundle, and (b) the maximum size b of each voter's bundle.
Specifically, we show that if κ is a d-bounded bundling function (that is, it is not required to contain all voters at a given distance), then Plurality-C-CC-AV is polynomial-time solvable if the maximum bundle size is one, but if the maximum bundle size is two, then Plurality-C-CC-AV is NP-hard. However, if κ is a full-d bundling function (that is, if is required to contain all voters at a given distance), then Plurality-C-CC-AV is polynomial-time solvable if the maximum bundle size is two, but if the maximum bundle size is three, then Plurality-C-CC-AV is NP-hard.
First, if b = 1, then C-CC-AV reduces to CC-AV and, thus, can be solved by a greedy algorithm in polynomial time [2] .
Observation 3. If the maximum bundle size b is one, then Plurality-C-CC-AV is polynomialtime solvable.
However, for arbitrary bundling functions, Plurality-C-CC-AV becomes intractable as soon as b = 2.
Theorem 4. Plurality-C-CC-AV is NP-hard even if the maximum bundle size b is two.
Proof. We provide a reduction from a restricted variant of the NP-complete problem 3SAT, where each clause has either two or three literals, each variable occurs exactly four times, twice as a positive literal, and twice as a negative literal.
(2,2)-3SAT
Input: A collection C of clauses over the set X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } of variables such that each clause has either two or three literals, and each variable appears exactly four times, twice as a positive literal and twice as a negative literal. Question: Is there a truth assignment that satisfies all the clauses in C? This variant is still NP-hard since from Tovey [37, Theorem 2.1], one obtained NP-hardness for 3SAT where each clause has either two or three literals, each variable occurs either two or three times, and at most one time as a negative literal.
We can reduce from this problem to (2,2)-3SAT as follows. First, we assume that no variable appears only positively, because if this is the case, we can just set it to true and remove it. For each variable x i that appears three times (two times positively and one time negatively), we add one new variable y i , and two new clauses {¬x i , ¬y i , ¬y i } and {¬y i , ¬y i }. For each variable x i that appears two times (one time positively and one time negatively), we add one new clause {¬x i , x i }. It can be verified that the original instance is a yes-instance if and only if the newly constructed instance is a yes-instance for (2,2)-3SAT. Now, given a (2,2)-3SAT instance (C, X ), where C is the set of clauses over the set of variables X , we construct an election (C, V ). We set k := 4|X |, and construct the set C of alternatives to be C := {p, w} ∪ {c i | C i ∈ C}, where the c i are called the clause alternatives. We construct the set V of registered voters such that the initial score of w is 4|X |, the initial score of the clause alternative c i is 4|X | − |C i | + 1 (where |C i | is the number of literals that clause C i contains), and the initial score of p is zero. We construct the set W of unregistered voters as follows (throughout the rest of the proof, we will often write ℓ j to refer to a literal that contains variable x j ; depending on the context, ℓ j will mean either x j or ¬x j and the exact meaning will always be clear):
1. for each variable x j ∈ X , we construct four p-voters, denoted by p We define the assignment function κ as follows: For each variable x j ∈ X that occurs as a negative literal (¬x j ) in clauses C i and C s , and as a positive literal (x j ) in clauses C r and C t , we set κ(p Figure 1a .
The general idea is that in order to let p win, all p-voters must be in κ(W ′ ) and no clause alternative c i should gain more than (|C i | − 1) points. More formally, we show now that (C, X ) has a satisfying truth assignment if and only if there is a size-k subset W ′ ⊆ W such that p wins election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ )) (recall that k = 4|X |). For the "if" direction, let β : X → {T, F } be a satisfying truth assignment function for (C, X ). Intuitively, β will guide us through constructing the set W ′ in the following way: First, for each variable x j , we put into W ′ those voters c 
As per our intuitive argument, one can verify that all p-voters are contained in κ(W ′ ) and each clause alternative c i gains at most (|C i | − 1) points.
For the "only if" part, let W ′ be a subset of voters such that p wins election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ )). First, we make the following observation. Let x j be some variable and consider clauses C i and C s where literal ¬x j appears, and clauses C r and C t where literal x j appears. We claim that we can assume that κ(W ′ ) contains at most two voters among c 
}. In effect, we can replace W ′ with W ′′ defined as 
We will now argue that for each variable x j , κ(W ′ ) contains either the two voters of the form c xj or the two voters of the form c ¬xj . We start by observing that for each two clauses that contain the same variable but not the same literal, at least one corresponding clause voter must be added to the election (otherwise κ(W ′ ) would not contain all the unregistered p-voters). Thus, if one clause voter is not contained in κ(W ′ ), then both of its "neighboring" (in the sense of being adjacent in the bundling graph, depicted in Figure 1a ) clause voters must be included in κ(W ′ ). Together with the arguments from previous paragraphs, this means that for each variable x j , κ(W ′ ) either contains the two voters of the form c xj or the two voters of the form c ¬xj . This is critical for the sanity of the truth assignment function β we will construct now. In order to let p win, all p-voters must be added to the election. This means that for each two clauses that contain the same variable but not the same literal, at least one corresponding clause voter must be added to the election.
We set β : X → {T, F } such that β(x j ) := T if there is a clause voter c xj i / ∈ κ(W ′ ), and β(x j ) := F if there is a clause voter c ¬xj i / ∈ κ(W ′ ). Following the previous arguments, function β is well-defined. It is a satisfying truth assignment function for (C, X ) because for each clause C i , by the fact that p is a winner in election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ )), we have that κ(W ′ ) contains at most (|C i | − 1) c i -voters for each clause alternative c i . This is possible only if each clause contains at least one literal ℓ such that β sets ℓ to truth.
The situation is different for full-d bundling functions, because we can extend the greedy algorithm by Bartholdi et al. [2] to bundles of size two.
Theorem 5. If κ is a full-d bundling function and the maximum bundle size b is two, then
Plurality-C-CC-AV is polynomial-time solvable.
Proof. Since b = 2 and κ is a full-d bundling function, the bundling graph has maximum degree one. Therefore, it contains only isolated vertices and disjoint edges. We first add the disjoint edges with both end-points corresponding to p-voters. If we have some more budget, then we add isolated vertices corresponding to p-voters. We are left only with isolated vertices corresponding to non-p-voters, which we throw away, disjoint edges with both end-points corresponding to nonp-voters, which we also throw away, and disjoint edges with one end-point corresponding to a p-voter and another end-point corresponding to a non-p-voter, which we treat now. Specifically, we add these disjoint edges with one end-point corresponding to a p-voter and another end-point corresponding to a non-p-voter, sorted ascendingly by the current score of the non-p-voter.
However, as soon as b = 3, we obtain NP-hardness, by modifying the reduction used in Theorem 4.
Given a PVC instance (G, h, ℓ), we set k := h, and construct an election E = (C, V ) with C := {p, w} ∪ {a i , a i , b i , b i | u i ∈ V (G)} such that the initial score of w is h + ℓ and the initial scores of all the other alternatives are zero. We do so by creating h + ℓ registered voters who all have the same preference order ≻ such that it differs from the following canonical preference order :
by only the first pair {p, w} of alternatives.
For each set P of disjoint pairs of alternatives, neighboring with respect to the canonical preference order, we define the preference order diff-order(P ) to be identical to the canonical preference order, except that all the pairs of alternatives in P are swapped. The unregistered voter set W is constructed as follows:
(i) for each edge e = {u i , u j } ∈ E(G), we create an edge voter w e with preference order diff-order({{a i , a i }, {a j , a j }}) (we say that w e corresponds to edge e),
(ii) for each edge e = {u i , u j } ∈ E(G), we create a dummy voter d e with preference order diff-order({{p, w}, {a i , a i }, {a j , a j }}) (we say that d e corresponds to edge e), and (iii) for each vertex u i ∈ V (G), we create a vertex voter w u i with preference order diff-order({{a i , a i }}) (we say that w u i corresponds to u i ).
The preference orders of the voters in V ∪ W are single-peaked with respect to the axis
where
Finally, we define the function κ such that it is a full-1 bundling function. To understand how κ works, we carefully calculate the swap distance between the preference orders of all possible pairs of voters in W . We see that: We show that (G, h, ℓ) is a yes-instance for PVC if and only if there is a size-k subset W ′ ⊆ W such that p is a Plurality winner of the election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ )). Note that all unregistered voters except the dummy voters prefer p over all other alternatives and that p needs at least h+ℓ points in order to win.
For the "only if" part, suppose that X ⊆ V (G) is a size-h vertex set and Y ⊆ E(G) is a size-ℓ edge set such that for every edge e ∈ Y it holds that e ∩ X = ∅. We set W ′ := {w u i | u i ∈ X}, and it is easy to verify that κ(W ′ ) consists of h vertex voters and at least ℓ edge voters. Each of them gives p one point if added to the election. This results in p being a winner of the election with score at least h + ℓ.
For the "if" part, suppose that there is a size-k subset W ′ ⊆ W such that p is a Plurality winner of the election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ )). 
. On the other hand, assume that exactly one of w ui , w uj does not belong to κ(W ′ \ {w e }) and let w u be this voter. It is easy to see that p is a winner of election (C, V ∪ κ((W ′ \ {w e }) ∪ {w u })) (the net effect of including the bundle of w e is that p's score increases by at most one, whereas the net effect of including the bundle of w u is that p's score increases by at least one). Similarly, if neither u i nor u j belong to κ(W ′ \ {w e }), then it is easy to verify that p is a winner of the election (C, V ∪ κ((W ′ \ {w e }) ∪ {w ui })). All in all, we can assume that W ′ contains vertex voters only. Since all vertex voters are p-voters, without loss of generality we can assume that W ′ contains exactly k = h of them. We define X := {u i | w u i ∈ W ′ } such that |X| = k, and Y := {e ∈ E(G) | e ∩ u i = ∅}. By the construction of the edge voters' preference orders, κ(W ′ ) consists of k vertex voters and |Y | edge voters. This must add up to at least h + ℓ voters. Therefore, |Y | ≥ ℓ, implying that at least ℓ edges are covered by X.
As for the Condorcet rule, we use the same unregistered voters as defined above and construct the original election with h+ℓ−1 registered voters whose preference orders are diff-order({w, p}). Using the same reasoning as used for the Plurality rule, one can verify that (G, h, ℓ) is a yesinstance for PVC if and only if there is a size-k subset W ′ ⊆ W such that p is a Condorcet winner of the election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ )).
We now present some tractability results for single-crossing elections. Consider an R-C-CC-AV instance ((C, V ), W, d, κ, p ∈ C, k), containing an election (C, V ) and an unregistered voter set W such that (C, V ∪ W ) is single-crossing, and thus, both (C, V ) and (C, W ) are single-crossing. This has a crucial consequence for full-d bundling functions: For each unregistered voter w ∈ W , the voters in bundle κ(w) appear consecutively along the single-crossing order restricted to only the voters in W .
2 Using the following lemmas, we can show that Plurality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-C-CC-AV are polynomial-time solvable in some cases. Proof. Let n := |W | and let α := w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n be a single-crossing order of the voters in W . Item (i) follows directly from the definition of the single-crossing property.
As for Item (ii), let W ′ ⊆ W be a size-k subset of unregistered voters such that p is a Plurality winner in election (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ )). For each subset S ⊆ W of voters, we use 1st(S) (resp. 2nd(S)) to denote the index j (resp. j ′ ) of the first voter w j ∈ S (resp. the last voter w j ′ ∈ S) along the single-crossing order. Suppose that there are two bundles, κ(w i ) and κ(w j ), with 1st(κ(w i )) ≤ 1st(κ(w j )) such that both contain non-p-voters and the first p-voter along α. If 2nd(κ(w i )) ≤ 2nd(κ(w j )), then κ(w i ) does not contain more p-voters than κ(w j ) does, while containing at least as many non-p-voters as κ(w j ). Thus, we can remove w i from W ′ . Otherwise, 2nd(κ(w i )) > 2nd(κ(w j )), which means that κ(w j ) ⊂ κ(w i ). Thus, we can remove w j from W ′ . In any case, we conclude that W ′ contains at most one voter w whose bundle κ(w) contains a non-p-voter and the first p-voter (along the single-crossing order).
Analogously, we can show that W ′ contains at most one voter w whose bundle κ(w) contains a non-p-voter and the last p-voter (along the single-crossing order). Since for each bundle κ(w) with w ∈ W ′ , if κ(w) contains a non-p-voter, then it contains at least one of the first and last voters along α, every bundle κ(w) with w ∈ W ′ contains at least one p-voter (because if it does not, then we can remove its respective leader voter, as the bundle does not help p), and Item (ii) follows.
For Condorcet voting, we use the well-known median-voter theorem (we provide the proof for the sake of completeness). Proof. Let X 1 be the set of voters x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ⌈z/2⌉−1 and let X 2 be the set of voters V ∪κ(W ′ )\ (X 1 ∪ X median ).
For the "if" part, let c be an arbitrary alternative from C \ {p}. Then, if there is some voter in X 1 which prefers c over p, then all voters in X median ∪ X 2 prefer p over c. If there is some voter in X 2 which prefers c over p, then all voters in X 1 ∪ X median prefer p over c. In any case, a strict majority of voters prefer p over c. Thus, p is the (unique) Condorcet winner.
For the "only if" part, suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is a voter in X median which is not a p-voter but a c-voter with c ∈ C \ {p}. Then, analogously to the reasoning above, at least half of the voters will prefer c over p-a contradiction.
With these two lemmas available, we give polynomial-time algorithms for both Plurality-C-CC-AV and Condorcet-C-CC-AV, for the case of single-crossing elections and full-d bundling functions. Proof. First, we find a (unique) single-crossing voter order for (C, V ∪ W ) in quadratic time [14, 8] . Due to Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we only need to store the most preferred alternative of each voter to find the solution set W ′ . Thus, the running-time from now on only depends on the number of voters. We start with the Plurality rule and let α := w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w |W | be a single-crossing voter order.
Due to Lemma 2 (ii), the two bundles in κ(W ′ ) which may contain non-p-voters appear at the beginning and at the end of the p-voter block, along the single-crossing order. We first guess these two bundles, and after this initial guess, all remaining bundles in the solution contain only p-voters (Lemma 2 (i)). Thus, the remaining task is to find the maximum score that p can gain by selecting k ′ bundles containing only p-voters. This problem is equivalent to the Maximum Interval Cover problem, which is solvable in O(|W | 2 ) time (Golab et al. [22, Section 3.2] ). For the Condorcet rule, we propose a slightly different algorithm. The goal is to find a minimum-size subset W ′ ⊆ W such that p is the (unique) Condorcet winner in (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ )). Let β := x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x z be a single-crossing voter order for (C, V ∪ W ). Considering Lemma 3, we begin by guessing at most two voters in V ∪ W whose bundles may contain the median p-voter (or, possibly, several p-voters) along the single-crossing order of voters restricted to the final election (for simplicity, we define the bundle of each registered voter to be its singleton). The voters in the union of these two bundles must be consecutively ordered. Let those voters be x i , x i+1 , . . . , x i+j (where i ≥ 1 and j ≥ 0), let W 1 := {x s ∈ W | s < i}, and let W 2 := {x s ∈ W | s > i + j}. We guess two integers z 1 ≤ |W 1 | and z 2 ≤ |W 1 | with the property that there are two subsets B 1 ⊆ W 1 and B 2 ⊆ W 2 with |B 1 | = z 1 and |B 2 | = z 2 such that the median voter(s) in V ∪B 1 ∪{x i , x i+1 , . . . , x i+j } ∪B 2 are indeed p-voters (for now, only the sizes z 1 and z 2 matter, not the actual sets). These four guesses cost O(|V ∪ W | 2 · |W | 2 ) time. The remaining task is to find two minimum-size subsets W 2 ) time [22] . We conclude that one can find a minimum-size subset W ′ ⊆ W such that p is the (unique) Condorcet winner in (C, V ∪ κ(W ′ )) in O(|V ∪ W | 2 · |W | 4 ) time.
Conclusion
We provide opportunities for future research. First, we did not discuss destructive control and the related problem of combinatorial deletion of voters. For Plurality, we conjecture that combinatorial addition of voters for destructive control, and combinatorial deletion of voters for either constructive or destructive control behave similarly to combinatorial addition of voters for constructive control. Another, even wider field of future research is to study other combinatorial voting modelsthis may include controlling the swap distance, "probabilistic bundling", "reverse bundling", or using other distance measures than the swap distance. Naturally, it would also be interesting to consider other problems than election control (with bribery being perhaps the most natural candidate).
Finally, instead of studying a "leader-follower model" as we did, one might also be interested in an "enemy model" referring to control by adding alternatives: The alternatives of an election "hate" each other such that if one alternative is added to the election, then all of its enemies are also added to the election. This scenario of combinatorial candidate control deserves future investigation.
Bibliography

